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Abstract—Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system with efficient Demand
Response Management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of
supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at
EVs. An incentivilized DRM approach is studied to reduce the
system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated
with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling based
auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators
sit on the first level auction responsible to communicate with
a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider Quality of Energy
(QoE) requirements and report interests and decisions on the
bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auc-
tion winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the
amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the
impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance
with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The
designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic prop-
erties. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism can
reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to
participate in the V2G DRM operation.
Index Terms—Vehicle-to-grid, auction, group-selling, demand
response management.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE current power grid has raging infrastructures. Withincreasing demand of electricity, it faces many problems
such as blackouts and grid reliability. Rolling blackouts has
been implemented in many countries such as China and South
Africa, which has restrict the GDP growth significantly and
made huge economical losses to these countries. Smart grid
has been widely regarded as an excellent long-term solution
to the global energy crisis, with enhanced electricity genera-
tion capacity, integrated digital communication, more efficient
Manuscript received October 29, 2014.Accepted for publication August 31,
2015. Copyright (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China (61374189), the Information Technology Research Projects of Ministry
of Transport of China (2014364X14040), the Fundamental Research Funds
for the Central Universities (ZYGX2013J009), the EU FP7 Project CLIMBER
(PIRSES-GA-2012-318939).
M. Zeng and S. Leng (corresponding author) are with the School of Com-
munication and Information Engineering, University of Electronic Science and
Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan Province, 611731 China (Phone: +86
028 618-305-20; Fax: +86 028 618-305-20; e-mail: spleng@uestc.edu.cn).
S. Maharjan is with Simula Research Laboratory, Fornebu 1364, Norway
(e-mail: sabita@simula.no).
S. Gjessing is with Simula Research Laboratory, Fornebu, Norway, and also
with the Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Oslo 1325, Norway
(e-mail: steing@simula.no).
J. He is with Aston University, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK (e-mail:
j.he7@aston.ac.uk).
demand-side management and load balancing for efficiency
improvement.
Parallelly with increasing concerns on fossil-fuel emission
and global warming EVs is widely accepted to be a key
solution for future road transport systems. The exponential-
ly increasing number of EVs is expected to generate huge
electricity demands and make the energy crisis even more
worse. Vehicle to Grid (V2G) is a promising solution to the
problem by reducing the peak-to-average ratio of the electric
grid load curve and balancing supply and demand. EVs are
mobile electricity storage units in a V2G system. Surplus
electricity stored in EVs can be fed back into the grid, which
can mitigate the pressure of building new electricity generator
while satisfying imminent electricity demands [1]. However,
one key problem to solve when integrating V2G systems
into the electricity market, is the efficient management of the
demand response.
There is a requirement on the coordination between the
electricity market, the EVs and the grid to trade surplus
electricity of EVs. But it is very challenging to balance the
objectives of the involved parties, due to the following reasons.
On one hand, the amount of deficit power of the grid changes
dynamically over time, due to the reasons such as inaccurate
day-ahead consumption prediction and uncertain electricity
output from renewable sources like wind and solar energy. The
grid needs to decide a proper amount of electricity to purchase
from the EVs with an objective of minimizing the payment
for the electricity from the EVs in the open electricity market.
From a long term point of view, the payment to buy the surplus
electricity of the EVs should not be higher than that for buying
the same amount of electricity produced by power generators.
On the other hand, the unit price for feedback electricity from
each EV may be different. A necessary condition that an EV is
willing to sell its surplus electricity is that the price is higher
than the charging cost. To balance the benefits of the grid
and the EVs, demand response management (DRM) becomes
a critical component of the V2G system for determination of
electricity transaction amounts between the EVs and the grid
with proper prices for the electricity bought from the EVs.
In the existing mechanisms for DRM optimal centralized
solutions are widely used. But in order to balance the demand
and the supply of the grid, these solutions are not scalable
and practical for the DRM problem in V2G system due to
the large number of participating EVs. Decentralized con-
trol schemes using game theory have been applied to the
2charging scheduling problem of EVs [9][10].Fundamentally
the DRM problem in V2G systems is an electric energy
resource allocation problem with a large number of electricity
providers and consumers. In order to balance the benefits
of both EVs and the grid in V2G systems, we believe a
sophisticated auction mechanism could be a promising so-
lution. Auction is a decentralized market mechanism which
can adaptively allocate electricity feedback opportunities in
an efficient and fair way. Since a single EV can only provide
limited electric energy resources, the proposed auction based
mechanism should offer enough incentive to encourage a large
number of EVs to participate in the V2G system. Inspired by
Groupon for spectrum auction [2], we propose a group-selling
strategy for the V2G DRM problem. In the proposed strategy
a feedback based price scheme is designed to motivate the
EVs to participate the auctions by taking into account the
cost of electric energy generation and the charging costs of
the EVs. Moreover, as the power grid is the only buyer and
the EVs are the multiple sellers, reverse auction matches this
scenario. Therefore, we use an incentivized reverse auction for
the group-selling approach. The design objective is to reduce
the cost of balancing the supply and the demand of the grid,
while making more profit for the EVs to stimulate them to
participate in the V2G system.
In this paper, we have the following major contributions.
• We introduce a group-selling mechanism for the DRM
problem in the V2G systems, and formulate the DRM problem
as a two-level auction model. In the first level, we have an
auction process between the EVs and the aggregators; while
we have an auction between the aggregators and the electric
grid in the second level.
• We propose a group-selling formation (GSF) algorithm
and a group determination (GD) algorithm to implement the
auctions for the DRM model efficiently. The GSF algorithm
is further extended to power constrained GSF (PC-GSF) algo-
rithm, for the scenarios where the aggregators have constraints
on the maximum feedback power.
• We prove with theoretical analysis that the proposed
group bidding mechanism possesses economic properties, and
simulation results verify the convergence of the GD algorithm.
Moreover, simulations are conducted to investigate the impact
of the aggregator’s maximum feedback power constraint on the
profit of the EVs. Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency
of the proposed approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related research work. In Section III, we propose
the system model, the feedback based price scheme, as well
as the cost function of the grid. The optimization problem
for DRM in V2G system is formulated in Section IV. Section
V presents the group bidding mechanism in detail. Then, we
analyze the economic properties of the proposed mechanism,
such as truthfulness, individual rationality and ex-post budget
balance. Simulation results presented in Section VI indicate
that the proposed mechanism is able to reduce the cost of the
grid for supplying its deficit power and obtain more profit for
the EVs participating in the V2G system. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
DRM is a key issue in V2G systems. There are some works
studying DRM for EV charing and discharging in smart grids.
[3] goes over the mathematical models in demand response
programs in smart grids and summarize the approaches such
as convex optimization, game theory, dynamic programming,
Markov decision process, stochastic programming and particle
swarm optimization. In [4], a multi-objective optimization
problem is formulated to schedule charging and discharging
for each EV in microgrids. Ant-colony-optimization based
heuristic scheduling algorithm is designed to minize cost for
EVs and reduce negative impacts on microgrids due to the
fluctuation of renewable distributed energy resources output.
In [5], priority-based policy is proposed for QoS differential
scheduling in cognitive-radio-based smart grid networks. The
system is modeled as a Semi-Markov decision process prob-
lem and dynamic programming is applied to find a solution.
[6] proposes an optimal centralized scheduling method via a
mixed integer linear programming, to jointly control charging
and discharging of plug-in EVs and electricity consumption
of home appliances. In [7], a distributed strategy based on
distributed dynamic programming algorithm is proposed to
optimally allocate the total power demand among different
generation units.
Quite a few literatures apply game theory in DRM problems
in smart grid. [8] introduces the architecture of EV fasting
charging and proposes resource allocation scheme jointly
considering power and customer allocation via Stackelberg
game model. Network operator is leader in the game while EV
customers are followers. Through a non-cooperative Stackel-
berg game model, the authors in [9] investigate the benefits
of distributed energy resources using an energy management
scheme for a smart community which consists of a large
number of residential units and a shared facility controller.
In [10], the DRM problem is addressed in a network of
multiple utility companies and consumers using a Stackelberg
game to maximize the revenue of each utility company and
the payoff of each user. [11] presents a noncooperative game
theoretic consumption scheduling framework based on mixed
integer programming optimization technique to schedule the
energy consumption at household level. In [12], the interaction
between utility companies and residential users is modeled
as a two-level game, where the competition among utility
companies is a non-cooperative game and the interaction
among residential users is an evolutionary game. [13] mod-
els the interaction between selfish and foresighted electricity
consumers as a repeated energy scheduling game and proposes
a novel framework for determining optimal nonstaionary DSM
strategies.
The most related work to ours is literature [14] which
designs an auction mechanism to trade energy in the smart
grid. However, our approach has the following distinguishing
features which make it different from the work in [14].
1) We first introduce a group-selling mode for the auction
mechanism design in V2G system, according to the fact that
surplus electricity provided by a single EV is far lower than
the amount that the grid demands. 2) Our proposed DRM
3approach is based a two-level reverse auction model, while
[14] applied a double auction mechanism. 3) Our work focuses
on the energy trade between electric vehicles (EVs) and the
grid in which mobility and Quality of Energy (QoE) guarantee
of EVs is considered, while [14] studied energy trade between
general distributed energy resources and consumers.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we consider a two-level auction based mech-
anism for DRM in V2G systems as shown in Fig. 1. The
single bidding mechanism in Fig. 1(a) entitles EVs to submit
their sealed bids directly to the grid. The grid then decides
which EVs wins and may feed back electricity. In the group
bidding mechanism shown in Fig. 1(b), each EV first submits
its sealed bid to an aggregator which organizes an electricity
feedback group, and relay the electricity from EVs towards
the grid. The aggregator should be located in the reachable
range of its group members. The remaining electricity in the
EV must support it to reach the aggregator as the group
organizer. After receiving bids from a certain number of EVs,
the aggregator forms a sealed group bid to the grid, which
describes the amount of electricity that the electricity feedback
group can offer, and the unit price of feedback electricity from
this group. In this group bidding mechanism auction processes
are conducted twice to solve the DRM problem. Aggregators
as group organizers decide the winner EVs in their groups,
and the grid determines the winner aggregators. Winner EVs
from the groups of the winner aggregators finally win the
opportunities to feed their surplus electricity back to the grid.
We let W denote the set of final winner EVs. The auc-
tion process usually contains two stages, i.e., allocation and
payment. Auction winners are determined in the allocation
stage and the payment to each auction winner is made in the
payment stage. Suppose we have N EVs and A aggregators.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., N} denote the set of the EVs, and
A = {1, 2, ..., A} denote the set of aggregators. Suppose
that the whole operation time in one day is divided into Nt
time slots. The length of each time slot is configurable as
required (e.g., 30 minutes). At the beginning of each time
slot, according to the supply and demand relationship of the
last time slot and the supply and demand prediction for current
slot, the grid decides how much electricity should be bought
from the EVs if the supply of the grid is less than the demand.
Let D denote the amount of deficit power of the grid, i.e. the
difference between the demand and the supply offered by the
power generators in the grid.
Let Cgrid(S) define the cost function as the sum of the
expenses paid to the EVs for buying their electricity and the
extra operational costs, which includes monetary cost here
referring to the cost for the different amount of electricity
between the demands of the grid and the total electricity
trading volume S, and time cost referring to the cost due to the
delay until the power can be provided. We have the following
formula for the calculation of cost function:
Cgrid(S) = g(|D − S|) +
∑
i∈W
p¯iq¯i (1)
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Fig. 1: Two auction based mechanisms for DRM in V2G
systems
where p¯i is the negotiated prices between the grid and each
winner EV, q¯i is the trading volume between the grid and each
winner EV, and g(.) is the generation cost function of the grid
including construction investment cost, fuel cost, operation
cost, maintenance cost, and environment cost, and etc [23].
Different amount of electricity between D and S may be
reduced but always exists after adopting V2G program, and
it will be generated by power generators if S < D. On the
contrary, if S > D, the extra cost is also needed to balance
D and S, and the curve of extra cost should be similar to the
generation cost curve shown in Fig. 2(a).
The objective of the DRM in the electric grid focuses on the
minimization of the cost function expressed by Equation (1).
However, EVs are expected to be paid with more than their
charging costs and the payment from the grid should cover
the cost due to the degradation of EVs’ batteries after every
charging/discharging cycle. Consequently, incentive mechanis-
m should offer profit to EVs. Moreover, a large number of EVs
should be encouraged to participate in the V2G system, since
4TABLE I: Peak-valley time-of-use (ToU) tariff in Fujian
Province in China [16]
amount of
electricity consumption
per month
peak-valley ToU tariff
per kWh
peak period
(8:00-22:00)
valley period
(22:00-24:00 and 00:00-8:00)
< 200kWh 0.5283 0.2983
≥ 200kWh
< 400kWh 0.5783 0.3483
≥ 401kWh 0.8283 0.5983
surplus electricity provided by a single EV is far lower than
the amount that the grid demands.
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Fig. 2: Pricing mechanism in the proposed group bidding
mechanism
We design a feedback based price scheme for the power
grid. The bidding price is a function of the amount of
electricity that the bidder can supply. The feedback electricity
unit price paid by the grid should be lower than the unit price
of the generation cost of the grid during peak period, but
higher than the unit price of the charging cost of EVs. Fig. 2
shows an example of the feedback based price scheme. The
feedback electricity unit price is a piecewise linear function
of the amount of electricity, denoted by gp(.). It is reasonable
that the curve of the feedback based electricity unit price has
the same shape as the generation cost of the grid. The values
of the specific unit prices in Fig. 2 are set according to real
data of the electricity market in Fujian Province, China, which
is shown in TABLE I. In this case, EVs that consume less than
200kWh electricity per month can make a profit if they charge
their batteries during the valley period and sell their surplus
electricity with an unit price above 0.2983 per kWh [15].
IV. AUCTION MECHANISMS DESIGN
Auction mechanisms used for DRM in V2G systems should
achieve the following design goals, 1) the operation cost of
the electric grid is reduced by incorporating V2G systems
rather than generating more energy; 2) EVs gain profit from
participating in V2G systems and do not experience any
inconveniences beyond their acceptable levels, i.e. avoiding a
detour or the shortage of electric energy on a trip; 3) auction
mechanisms should possess economic properties, such as ex-
post budget balance, individual rationality and truthfulness; 4)
the mechanisms should have low time complexity.
A. Single Bidding Mechanism
We first illustrate a single bidding mechanism as shown
in Fig.1(a) which will be used to compare the performance
of the proposed group bidding mechanism. In this simple
approach, aggregators do not participate in the auction and
they only offer interfaces for auction winner EVs to complete
electricity feedback. During the auction, bids from EVs are
directly submitted to the grid.
It is supposed that each EV sends a two-tuple bid Bi =
(pi, q
max
i ), i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} to the grid, where pi is the bid
price of EV i and qmaxi represents the maximum offered
electric energy of EV i. qmaxi takes into account the State
of Charge (SoC) at the plugging time and the departure time
of EV i since we assume the discharging rate of EV i is
fixed. Ws denotes the set of winner EVs. The optimization
of the single bidding mechanism aims at the minimization
of the cost of the grid. An integer linear programming (ILP)
model is deployed to describe the optimal problem in the
allocation stage of the single bidding mechanism. The decision
variables in the ILP model are binary, i.e., yi, i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}.
yi = 1 if EV i wins the auction, 0 otherwise. Given the above
definitions and notations, the ILP that models the problem can
be expressed as follows.
min Cgrid(
N∑
i=1
yiq
max
i ) (2)
s.t. yi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ 1, 2, ...N (3)
yi = 0,∀i /∈Ws; yi = 1,∀i ∈Ws (4)
The objective function (2) minimizes the cost that will
balance the difference between demand and supply. Con-
straints (3) and (4) ensure the integrality of the binary decision
variables.
The optimization problem expressed by Equation (2)-(4) can
be solved by CPLEX when the number of EVs participating
in the V2G system is small. However, the optimal problem is
NP-hard. The computation time increases drastically with the
number of EVs in the system.
Truthfulness is crucial for auction mechanisms. The pay-
ment stage in an auction mechanism has great influence
on truthfulness. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction
mechanism is the well-known for ensuring truth-telling of
bidders [20]-[22]. Applying the VCG auction mechanism, unit
price paid to each winner EVs, p¯V CGi can be calculated as
p¯V CGi = −
Cgrid(S,N\i)− Cgrid(S′, N\i)
qmaxi
, i ∈Ws (5)
where S′ represents the electricity trading volume if EV i does
not submit its bid to the auction. However, the above process
of calculation suffers from high computational complexity.
5Algorithm 1 (GSB: Greedy Single Bidding algorithm) is
proposed to complete the allocation stage in the single bid-
ding mechanism with lower complexity and gives truthfulness
guaranteed pricing to auction winners. The time complexity of
GSB is O(N). However, O(N) is still not acceptable if EVs
take the place of most gasoline vehicles. For instance, it is
reported that there had been 3.3494 million vehicles in Fujian
Province in China by 2012 [17].
Algorithm 1 GSB: Greedy Single Bidding algorithm
Initialization:
D; Bi = (pi, qmaxi ); i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}; Ws = ∅
Iteration:
1: Ls ⇐ Sort( piqmaxi , ”non− decreasing”);
2: for all i ∈ Ls do
3: if D > 0 then
4: D = D − qmaxi ;
5: Ws = Ws
⋃{i};
6: end if
7: end for
Output:
Ws,max(pi, i ∈Ws)
B. Group Bidding Mechanism
In this section, we propose an incentivized auction based
group bidding mechanism for V2G systems.
The auction is conducted in two levels. In the first level
auction, EVs join in feedback electricity groups managed
by different aggregators in order to obtain higher feedback
electricity unit prices. Each EV bids the bidding price accord-
ing to its expectation for the feedback electricity unit price
after joining the group. The negotiated price is related to the
amount of electricity that each EV’s group could offer to
the grid. Each EV sends one sealed bid to one aggregator.
Aggregator j decides the set of winner EVs Wfj in the first
level auction according to the bids it receives. On behalf of
these winning bids, the aggregators submit the group bids to
the grid, including the expected unit price and the amount
of electricity to be provided. In this second level auction,
aggregators become sellers and the grid is the buyer. The grid
will notify all members of the set of winner aggregators Wa
in the second level auction. And aggregator j, j ∈ Wa is
paid with unit price p¯gj . Then the winner aggregators publish
bidding results to the EV winners of the first level auction in
their groups. Finally, those EVs join the electricity feedback
and get the payment with unit price p¯ij . EVs that do not
participate in the two-level auction will not be authorized
to access discharging interfaces of aggregators. Meanwhile,
winner EVs who do not fulfill their discharging commitment
may have negative credit record as penalty.
In this paper, the utility of EV i is defined as
Ui =
{
p¯ij − pij if i ∈Wfj
0 otherwise
(6)
The utility of the auctioneer is defined as
Uaj =
{
p¯gj − p¯ij if j ∈Waj
0 otherwise
(7)
1) First Level Auction: In the first level auction, we design
an algorithm for the formation of feedback electricity group.
Aggregators as group organizers calculate the amount of
feedback electricity and unit prices for their groups. These
calculation results will then be the crucial elements of the
two-tuple bids in the second level auction.
Nj denotes the set of EVs which send their bids to aggre-
gator j, (i.e., group j) and Nj represents the number of bids.
Since we assume each EV only sends one bid to one aggrega-
tor, Nj also represents the number of EVs which participate
in the feedback electricity group j. Each EV bidder sends its
two-tuple sealed bid Bi = (pij(Qij), qmaxij ), i ∈ Nj, j ∈ A to
an aggregator which is in its reachable range, where A denotes
the set of aggregators as feedback electricity group organizers
and A is the number of aggregators. Qij is the amount of
electricity that the group that EV i belongs to is expected to
offer. Unit price pij asked by EV i is determined under the
feedback based price scheme. For example, if EV i expects
the unit price paid by aggregator j for its electricity is 0.5983
per kWh, the amount of electricity provided by its group is
expected to be no less than 2000 kWh.
Other denotations in the group bidding mechanism are the
same as that in the single bidding mechanism. Algorithm 2
(GSF: Group-Selling Formation algorithm) presents the details
of feedback electricity group formation process.
Algorithm 2 GSF: Group-Selling Formation algorithm
Initialization:
Bi = (pij(Qij), q
max
ij ); j; ηj ; Nj ; W
f
j = ∅
Iteration:
1: Qs ⇐ Sort(qmaxij , ”non− increasing”);
2: qcj = Qs(d ηj ∗Nje);
3: Qss ⇐ Sort(Qij , ”non− decreasing”);
4: for k = d ηj ∗Nje − 1 to 1 do
5: if Qkj ≤ (d ηj ∗Nje − k) ∗ qcj then
6: Wfj = [1 : k];
7: qgj = sizeof(W
f
j ) ∗ qcj ;
8: pgj = gp(Q(k+1)j);
9: break;
10: end if
11: end for
Output:
qgj , p
g
j
The GSF algorithm is proposed to obtain group-selling
electricity amounts and group-selling unit prices. The basic
idea of the GSF algorithm is to remove those V2G EVs which
ask for high prices beyond certain limits or which can only
supply the amount of electricity less than the threshold value,
aggregator forms a feedback EV group with as much elec-
tricity as possible. ηj is a parameter used by each aggregator
j to decide the threshold amount of electricity qcj . Different
aggregators could have either the same or different ηj . EVs
6are first sorted by the quantity of electricity they can provide
in non-increasing order, and EVs that could only sell less than
qcj are removed. Then, among the remaining EVs, those with
unreachable high unit price for their feedback electricity lose
the auction. The GSF algorithm is executed independently
by each aggregator. The tuple (pgj , q
g
j ) forms the bid B
a
j of
aggregator j, j ∈ A, and this bid will be sent to the grid
to compete for the second level auction. Auction results of
the first level are not published by aggregators immediately,
because EV i, i ∈ Wfj , is not the final winner in the two-
level auction, and pgj is not the final unit price. If aggregator j
wins the second level auction, EV winners belonging to winner
groups in the second level auction are the EVs which will feed
back electricity to the grid.
2) Second Level Auction: The second level auction is
conducted between the aggregators and the electric grid. Bid
Baj = (p
g
j , q
g
j ) is submitted by aggregator j to the grid. Wa is
the set of aggregators that are the second level auction winners.
The allocation stage of the second level auction can also be
formulated as an ILP. The decision variables in the ILP are
binary variables xj , j ∈ A, and xj = 1 if the group j wins the
second level auction, 0 otherwise. The optimal in the allocation
stage of the second level auction attempts to minimize the
cost of the grid. Given above definitions and notations, the
optimization problem is formulated as an ILP, that is
min Cgrid(
A∑
j=1
xjq
g
j ) (8)
s.t. xj ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ A (9)
xj = 0,∀j /∈Wa;xj = 1,∀j ∈Wa (10)
The objective function (8) minimizes the cost to balance the
difference between demand and supply of the grid. Constraints
(9) and (10) ensure the integrality of the binary decision
variables.
The complexity to find the optimal solution of the above
problem is high if the classic VCG auction mechanism is used
[20]. We propose Algorithm 3 (GD: Group Determination)
to determine the winner groups in the second level auction.
This algorithm retains the property of truthfulness of the VCG
auction mechanism.
Algorithm 3 GD: Group Determination algorithm
Initialization:
D; Baj = (p
g
j , q
g
j ); j ∈ A; Wa = ∅
Iteration:
1: Lg ⇐ Sort(p
g
j
qgj
, ”non− decreasing”);
2: for all j ∈ Lg do
3: if D > 0 then
4: D = D − qgj ;
5: Wa = Wa
⋃{j};
6: end if
7: end for
Output:
Wa,max(p
g
j , j ∈Wa)
In the GD algorithm, aggregators are first sorted in non-
decreasing order by
pgj
qgj
. Then the grid goes through the aggre-
gators in the sorted list. For each aggregator, the grid examines
whether the total electricity demand has been satisfied. The
loop ends until the electricity demand is satisfied. Otherwise,
the aggregator in this round becomes an auction winner and
the electricity demand is updated. The unit price paid to all
winner aggregators is the maximum unit price that aggregators
belonging to Wa request.
The electric grid now publishes the aggregator winners,
and the EV winners of the two-level auction can also be
announced. At this time each EV winner i (i ∈Wfj , j ∈Wa)
is required to feed qcj units of electricity through aggregator j
towards the grid. Aggregators charges the grid with the unit
price p¯gj and each aggregator pays to its winner EVs with the
unit price p¯ij .
3) Optimization in a Practical Scenario: In the above
schemes, we considered the special case that the maximum
feedback power of each aggregator is unbounded. The maxi-
mum feedback power of an aggregator is a key factor when the
aggregators organize the feedback from EV groups. Similar
to the power control in communication networks, in order
to protect the operation of the grid and the aggregators, we
consider a practical scenario where the amount of feedback
electricity of each aggregator may feed back cannot exceed
a maximum value during each unit time. We also develop
an algorithm for this scenario. Assume that each aggregator
maximally can feed back the power P aj , j ∈ A. Feedback
EVs in the same group parallelly connect to the electricity
feedback interfaces of the aggregator. Each EV submits its
electricity feedback power requirement Pij to the aggregator
with its bidding information. The power constrained group-
selling formation for each aggregator j can be modeled as a
constraint knapsack problem as follows.
max qgj (11)
s.t. ygij ∈ {0, 1} (12)∑
i∈Nj
Pijy
g
ij ≤ P aj (13)
The decision variables in the above optimal problem are binary
ygij , i ∈ Nj, and ygij = 1 if EV i is in the group j, 0 otherwise.
The constraint knapsack problem is NP-hard. Algorithm 4
(PC-GSF: Power Constrained Group-Selling Formation algo-
rithm) is an extended version of the GSF algorithm used to
resolve the allocation problem with power constraints.
Different with the GSF algorithm, under the PC-GSF al-
gorithm, if constraint (13) is not satisfied, the amount of
electricity threshold qcj should be updated iteratively until
constraint (13) is satisfied. Since the kernel of the PC-GSF
and the GSF algorithms is the same, both of them guarantee
the truthfulness of the group bidding mechanism.
C. Complexity Analysis of Group Bidding Mechanism
1) GSF Algorithm: In the GSF algorithm, the two sort-
ings are both O(Nj logNj) [3] and the loop takes at most
O(d ηj ∗Nje−1) time. The complexity of the GSF algorithm
is hence O(Nj logNj).
7Algorithm 4 PC-GSF: Power Constrained Group-Selling For-
mation algorithm
Initialization:
Bi = (pij(Qij), q
max
ij , Pij); j; ηj ; Nj ; P
a
j ; W
f
j = ∅
Iteration:
1: Qs ⇐ Sort(qmaxij , ”non− increasing”);
2: qcj = Qs(d ηj ∗Nje);
3: Qss ⇐ Sort(Qij , ”non− decreasing”);
4: r=1;
5: for k = d ηj ∗Nje − r to 1 do
6: if Qkj ≤ (d ηj ∗Nje − k) ∗ qcj then
7: Wfj = [1 : k];
8: if
∑
i∈Wfj
Pij ≤ P aj then
9: qgj = sizeof(W
f
j ) ∗ qcj ;
10: pgj = gp(Q(k+1)j);
11: break;
12: else
13: qcj = Qs(d ηj ∗Nje − r);
14: r = r + 1;
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
Output:
qgj , p
g
j
2) GD Algorithm: The time complexity of the GD algo-
rithm is O(A), where A N .
3) PC-GSF Algorithm: For the PC-GSF algorithm, the
complexity of the same part in the GSF algorithm is
O(Nj logNj). Besides, examining whether the feedback power
constraint of each aggregator has been satisfied will lead to the
update of the electricity amount threshold of all EVs. If the
feedback power constraint has not been satisfied, the same part
contained in the GSF algorithm will be executed again. Thus,
this part will be executed at most d ηj ∗Nje − 1 − P
a
j
max(Pij)
times. However, d ηj ∗Nje − 1− P
a
j
max(Pij)
< Nj , hence, the
overall complexity of the PC-GSF algorithm is O(Nj logNj).
D. Economic Properties of Group Bidding Mechanism
As the proposed group bidding mechanism is a two-level
auction process, all the economic robustness properties such as
truthfulness, individual rationality and ex-post budget balance
[20] must essentially be guaranteed. In this section, we will
prove that the proposed mechanism does posses the economic
robustness of auction mechanisms.
Definition 1: Truthfulness
An auction is truthful, if each buyer or seller cannot improve
its own utility by bidding higher or lower than its true value.
In the proposed mechanism, truthfulness can be realized only
if all EV sellers to report their true values on their expected
values of group size and the maximum amount of electricity
they can offer.
Definition 2: Individual Rationality
A reverse auction is individually rational if no auction
winner is paid less than what it bids. This property provides
incentives for EVs to participate in a reverse auction based
V2G system.
Definition 3: Ex-post Budget Balance
An auction is ex-post budget balanced if the auctioneer’s
utility is not less than 0. This property ensures that aggregators
have incentives to set up auctions and organize the groups for
electricity feedback.
Theorem 1: The proposed group bidding mechanism is
individually rational, i.e., p¯ij ≥ pij and p¯gj ≥ pgj .
Proof: In the GSF algorithm, we sort the bidding prices
of EVs (or aggregators) in a non-decreasing order, and pay
the first level auction winner EV i, i < k (or the second level
auction winner aggregator j, j < l) with the bidding price of
the kth EV (or the lth aggregator), i.e., pij < pkj (or p
g
j < p
g
l ).
Theorem 2: The proposed group bidding mechanism is ex-
post budget balanced, i.e. Uaj ≥ 0.
Proof: Because p¯gj = max(p
g
j , j ∈Wa) and p¯ij = pgj =
g(Q(i+1)j), it is obvious that Uaj = p¯
g
j − p¯ij ≥ 0.
Theorem 3: The group bidding mechanism is truthful in
both the first level auction and the second level auction.
Proof: Since the group bidding mechanism consists of the
GSF algorithm and the GD algorithm, the truthfulness proof
of the group bidding mechanism will be accomplished in two
parts. One proof for the truthfulness of the GSF algorithm,
and another for the truthfulness of the GD algorithm.
Lemma 1: The first level auction is truthful for all EVs.
Proof: We show that in all the cases EVs cannot improve
their utilities by bidding untruthfully.
Case 1: EV i wins when both bidding truthfully and untruth-
fully. No matter whether EV i bids truthfully or untruthfully,
it will get the same paid as an auction winner.
Case 2: EV i fails when both bidding truthfully and un-
truthfully. The utility of EV i is always zero, and there is no
incentive to bid untruthfully.
Case 3: EV i wins when bidding truthfully and fails when
bidding untruthfully. According to the utility function of EVs
we define, a winner EV’s utility is non-negative and a loser
EV’s utility is zero.
Case 4: EV i fails when bidding truthfully and wins when
bidding untruthfully. With the GSF algorithm, if EV i fails
when bidding truthfully, it fails either because qmaxij < q
c
j
or because Qij > (d ηj ∗Nje − i) ∗ qcj . If qmaxij < qcj , it is
assumed that EV i wants to win by bidding untruthfully. It then
has to submit qmaxij ≥ qcj . Suppose EV i wins by submitting
qmaxij ≥ qcj . However, its utility remains zero because it cannot
afford that winner EVs are appointed to feedback qcj kWh
electricity. If Qij > (d ηj ∗Nje−i)∗qcj , and EV i wants to win
by bidding untruthfully, it has to submit Qij ≤ (d ηj ∗Nje−
i)∗qcj . Under the GSF algorithm, g(Qij) > g(Q(i+1)j) and the
winner EVs will be paid a price of g(Q(i+1)j). The untruthful
Qij is smaller than the truthful Qij , hence the payment of
untruthful bidding will be less.
Consequently, analysis of all the cases above proves that
all EVs will choose to send the truthful two-tuple bids
(pij(Qij), q
max
ij ).
Lemma 2: The second level auction is truthful for aggrega-
tors.
8Proof: We first elaborate that a two-dimensional reverse
auction is truthful if it is qualified with the following characters
[18][19].
Exactness: for a bid bj = (s, a), either gj = s or gj = ∅,
where gj is the amount of goods offered by bidder j in a
reverse auction.
Monotonicity: if j’s bid is granted when j declares the bid
(s, v), it is also granted if j declares (s′, v′) for any s′ ≤
s, v′ ≥ v.
Participation: j /∈ W ⇒ pj = 0, where W is the set of
auction winners.
Critical: given a bidder j, supply of goods and declarations
for all other bidders, there exists a critical value vc such that
∀v, v < vc ⇒ gj = ∅
∀v, v > vc ⇒ gj = s.
Exactness and participation are straightforward ensured by
the GD algorithm and the utility definition of aggregators.
In the GD algorithm, aggregators are sorted by
pgj
qgj
in non-
decreasing order, and there exists an critical value (
pgj
qgj
)c.
Hence the GD algorithm satisfies both Monotonicity and
Criticality.
So far, we have proved that both parts of the group bidding
mechanism are truthful. It can be concluded that the proposed
group bidding mechanism is truthful.
Corollary 1: The PC-GSF algorithm is truthful.
Proof: The only difference between the GSF and the PC-
GSF algorithms is that after determining the winner EV set,
the maximum feedback power constraint of the aggregator
is checked in the PC-GSF algorithm. The same part of the
GSF algorithm is operated until the constraint is satisfied.
This will not incur any impact on the economic robustness.
Consequently, the PC-GSF algorithm is as truthful as the GSF
algorithm.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of
the proposed auction based group-selling approach for DRM in
V2G system. It is expected that our group bidding mechanism
can reduce the cost of the grid. We will evaluate if the group
bidding mechanism can seek more profit for the EVs in a V2G
system. Convergence of the algorithm that realizes the group-
selling approach will be verified. We will also investigate the
impact of the maximum feedback power of the aggregators on
the performance of the propose algorithm. Major simulation
parameter settings are listed in the following TABLE II.
TABLE II: Major simulation parameter settings
number of EVs 3.3494 million
number of aggregators 16497
distribution of EVs at each aggregator N(203, 4)
distribution of qmaxij U [7.857 33.162]
ηj , j ∈ A 0.9
It is assumed that vehicles will be substituted by EVs in
future and charging stations or aggregators for EVs will be
as common as gasoline stations. Consequently, we consider
3.3494 million EVs participating in the simulation scenario
[15]. The number of aggregators A is set as 16497, according
to the results from searching ”gasoline station in Fujian
Province” on the Google map. The number of EVs feeding
back their electricity at each aggregator is Gaussian distributed
with a mean value 203 (≈ 3349400/16497) and variance
4. The maximum amount of electricity offered by each EV
is uniformly distributed over [7.857 33.162] kWh [16]. Unit
prices asked by EVs under the single bidding mechanism and
that under the group bidding mechanism are gp(qmaxij ) and
gp(Qij), respectively. η is set as 0.9 for all aggregators.
Fig. 3 shows the convergence of the GD algorithm in two
different scenarios when the demands from the grid equal
5000MWh and 10000MWh, respectively. The convergence of
the GD algorithm is illustrated by the change of the grid’s
cost when the algorithm is executed. It is observed that in
both scenarios that the cost of the grid converges before the
algorithm terminates. Moreover, it can be found that when the
demand for electricity is lower, the convergence speed of the
GD algorithm is faster. This is because that the removal of
one group has a larger impact on the cost. However, the cost
of the grid with a 5000MWh electricity demand is absolutely
lower than that when the demand is 10000MWh.
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Fig. 3: Convergence of the GD algorithm
To verify that the capability of cost reduction of the
proposed group bidding mechanism, the benchmark is se-
lected as the method that power generators generates an
imbalanced amount of electricity between supply and de-
mand. Fig. 4 shows that the cost of the grid when ap-
plying the group bidding mechanism is always lower than
the method Generating by Power Generators. Another
observation is that the cost gap between the two ways becomes
larger when the grid demands more electricity.
Fig. 5 shows the proposed group bidding mechanism is
effective in shaping the electric load curve of the grid. Under
the group bidding mechanism in V2G system, peak load and
load variation of the grid can be reduced remarkably.
Fig. 6 shows the unit price that each EV auction winner
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Fig. 5: Electric load curve under different schemes
will be paid by using the single bidding mechanism and the
group bidding mechanism, respectively. It is clear that under
the single bidding mechanism, the unit price for each EV
auction winner is always around 0.3 per kWh, which may not
motivate the EVs to participate in the V2G system. However,
by applying the group bidding mechanism, the EV auction
winners can gain much higher unit prices for their feedback
electricity.
Fig. 7 represents the unit prices for electricity feedback
under different maximum feedback power constraints of the
aggregators. It is obvious that the power constraints limit the
group size for electricity feedback, and this will lead to lower
the unit prices for the EV auction winners. This simulation
results imply that there should be a tradeoff between profit
incentives for the EVs and the cost for installing aggregators
with large feedback power capacity.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
index of EV
fe
ed
ba
ck
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 u
ni
t p
ric
e 
pa
id
 b
y 
th
e 
gr
id
 (p
er 
kW
h)
 
 
Single Biddig Mechanism
Group Bidding Mechanism
Fig. 6: Feedback electricity unit prices that EV winners charge
the electric grid
600 800 1000 1200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
power constraint of aggregator (kW)
fe
ed
ba
ck
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 u
ni
t p
ric
e 
(pe
r k
W
h)
 
 
GSF
PC−GSF
Fig. 7: Impact on feedback electricity unit prices when four
aggregators have different power constraints
VI. CONCLUSION
Demand Response Management (DRM) is a critical compo-
nent of the V2G systems. In this paper, we proposed a group
bidding mechanism for the V2G DRM. A feedback based price
scheme is designed with the objective of motivating the EVs
to participate in the V2G electricity trading system by selling
their surplus electricity to the grid. A group bidding mech-
anism is implemented through a two-level reverse auction.
The group bidding mechanism is proven to be truthfulness
guaranteed, individually rational and ex-post budget balanced.
Simulation results indicate that the proposed approach can
help reduce the overall system cost of the grid compared
to straightforward strategy of generating the same amount
of extra electricity in peak period by power generators. The
proposed scheme can effectively provide incentives to the EVs,
as they can make profits from feeding power back into the
grid. Moreover, we investigate a practical scenario where the
10
aggregators have maximum feedback power constraints. The
proposed auction based group-selling approach for the DRM
in V2G systems is demonstrated to be a win-win approach for
both EVs and the electric grid.
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